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I. Introduction

Carliss Baldwin’s ‘‘Productivity and Labor
Unions: An Application of the Theory of SelfEnforcing Contracts’’ (1983), provides a rich
set of strategies firm might employ to counter
union opportunism in the context of long-lived
relation-specifi capital. This work both anticipated and in an important (dynamic) sense outflanke the collective voice view of unionism
(e.g., Freeman and Medoff 1984) and the ensuing slew of union productivity effects studies
(e.g., Addison and Hirsch 1989). Our purpose
here is to update Baldwin’s influentia work, renewing it to incorporate advances in game theory
that have taken hold since 1983.
Baldwin’s work has had staying power because it is a leading-edge application of the idea
that long-term interests can form the foundation
for credible self-enforcement of contracts. Her
core conclusion is that the union’s temptation for
opportunistic conduct is strongest if the life of
sunk capital is long in relation to the union’s horizon. Because unions represent current membership and property rights in the union are not transferable, these tendencies are likely to prevail.
* We thank, without implicating, an unusually generous referee for extensive comments on previous drafts of this article.
(Journal of Business, 1998, vol. 71, no. 3)
 1998 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0021-9398/98/7103-0002$02.50
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Baldwin (1983) asks
whether a fir can
credibly deter union opportunism that would
lead to underinvestment. We show that
the punishments Baldwin considers credible
exclude tougher threats
that only have the appearance of being selfdestructive. If the
firm’ discount factor
is sufficientl close to
one, union opportunism can indeed be deterred. Moreover, we
show that given the
firm’ discount factor,
a shorter lifetime of
capital does not necessarily promote effi
ciency. Although, as
Baldwin emphasizes, it
does enhance the
firm’ ability to punish
union opportunism, it
also creates adverse incentives for the fir to
engage in opportunistic
employment cuts.
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Baldwin provides a variety of ingenious remedies. These include the
use of inefficien capacity to make substantial cuts in employment, a
short-run profit-maximizin response to wage demands. Other proposed counterstrategies include a variety of measures designed to extend the union’s horizon and thereby avoid the use of an inefficien
defense by the firm
The debate over the efficienc of union contracts has long been dominated by a separate literature that takes capital to be exogenous and
focuses on the temptation of the fir to make an opportunistic cut in employment. Espinosa and Rhee (1989) bridge the underlying monopolyunion and efficien contracts models in this literature by showing that
in a repeated game setting efficien self-enforcing contracts are guaranteed to exist, provided the fir is sufficientl patient. There is some
irony here. Although Baldwin neglects opportunism by the firm her
application of repeated games to investment did predate their application to union employment.
Our update of Baldwin incorporates the potential for opportunistic
behavior from both sides by extending the repeated game of Espinosa
and Rhee (1989) to include sunk capital. We conclude that with suffi
cient patience on the part of the fir self-enforcing contracts will exist
that are efficien with respect to employment and investment. This
bottom-line result is of course sharply at odds with Baldwin in that
it holds irrespective of the union’s horizon or the productive life of
capital.
One key to this result lies in the natural order of play. The fir
observes the wage demand before selecting the concurrent level of employment, thereby permitting immediate punishment of union opportunism. In Espinosa and Rhee (1989) retaliating to wage breaches simply by choosing employment to maximize profi will deter union
opportunism in any of the set of efficient-contrac core of outcomes
that are mutually acceptable relative to the monopoly union equilibrium. With exogenous capital this set is nonempty.
Even with endogenous capital, there are conditions under which an
immediate one-period relocation to the labor demand curve is adequate to enforce an efficien contract acceptable to the firm Echoing
Baldwin, there are also conditions in which they will not because the
fir find it privately advantageous to cope with union opportunism
up front by underinvesting. Further echoing Baldwin, the firm’ ability to deter union malfeasance is strengthened if capital is finitel
durable, provided the union places some weight on the future. Following an extortionate union wage demand, the fir can reduce investment
and in so doing carry forward a deeper employment penalty into the
future.
But capital flexibilit is a two-edged sword: there is also the possibility that the finit durability of capital will itself cause inefficiency Sup-
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pose that efficien employment and investment would obtain with perfect durability. With finit durability, the fir may lose the incentive
to honor the contract if its discount factor is not sufficientl close to
one. The cost to the fir of losing the union’s trust is no longer so
severe because the fir can counter by reducing investment.
Baldwin rightly requires that retaliation to union opportunism be
credible. Relocating to the labor demand curve if the union cheats is
a credible form of punishment by the firm Baldwin sees tougher punishment as self-destructive and thus not credible. However, the logic
of the cost of future consequences applies not only to breach of contract
but also to the credibility of enforcement mechanisms. If its discount
factor is sufficientl close to one, the fir will defend a reputation for
toughness, a reputation for immediate cuts in employment severe
enough to remove the union’s temptation to cheat.
This insight implies that even unions with no concern for future consequences can be deterred from cheating. Baldwin’s remedies for effi
cient deterrence of union opportunism all boil down to extending the
union’s concern for punishment into the future. On our analysis, these
remedies are a substitute for a fir discount factor that is not suffi
ciently close to one.
The one-shot game that forms the foundation of our analysis is set
out in Section II. The focus of Section III is to establish a common
metric for the subsequent discussion of repeated play. Section IV then
examines Espinosa and Rhee’s (1989) result in the context of repeated
play of the one-shot game, while sections VA and VB consider on-thedemand punishment with perfectly durable and finitel durable capital,
respectively. Section VI introduces the innovation of more severe fir
punishment of opportunistic behavior on the part of the union. Section
VII concludes.
II. The One-Shot Game

A one-period multistage game forms the foundation for the repeated
game analysis to follow.1 This one-period game extends the monopolyunion model of wage and employment determination by including capital as an additional endogenous variable. There are two players, the
fir and the union. The firm’ objective is to maximize profi
π(w, N, K; r) ⫽ R(N, K ) ⫺ wN ⫺ rK,
where N ⫽ labor, K ⫽ capital, R(N, K ) ⫽ revenue, w ⫽ wage, and
r ⫽ rental price of capital. Exogenous to the model, r appears after a
1. Similar one-period models have been considered by Anderson and Devereux (1988)
and Hirsch and Prasad (1995).
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semicolon to distinguish it from the endogenous variables. It is assumed
that the firm’ revenue function R(N, K ) is strictly concave, that R N (N,
K ) ⬎ 0 and R K (N, K ) ⬎ 0, and that R NK (N, K ) ⬎ 0.
The union’s objective is to maximize utility U(w, N). To simplify
matters, its utility function is assumed to take the familiar union-rent
form
U(w, N) ⫽ (w ⫺ w 0)N,
where w 0 is the competitive market wage. The workers can and will
leave the fir if wage falls below the competitive wage. In the relevant
region w ⱖ w 0, the union-rent utility function is quasiconcave.
The order of play in the one-shot multistage game is
fir

chooses K → union chooses w → fir

chooses N.

That is, the fir moves first choosing K. Observing K and taking it
as given, the union moves second and sets w. Finally, knowing K and
w, the fir chooses N in the third stage. The last two moves follow
the order of play in the monopoly-union model in which the union
sets the wage unilaterally but the firm retaining the right to manage,
determines employment. Appending the firm’ investment in K as the
firs move of the extended model captures the notion that capital is
relatively inflexible thereby possibly exposing the fir to subsequent
holdup by the union.
A strategy for a player is a complete set of instructions specifying
what the player would do in each possible contingency. In the oneperiod model, a strategy for the union expresses the wage as a function
of capital. For the fir in this one-period model, a strategy designates
a level of capital and specifie employment as a function of capital and
the wage. Nash subgame-perfect equilibrium is adopted as the solution
concept both for this one-period model and in the subsequent repeatedgame analysis. Under the Nash requirement, each player’s strategy
must be a best response to the other’s strategy. Subgame perfection
rules out strategies that embody incredible threats. Specifically a threat
is credible only if the player would be prepared to carry it out if called
on to do so. Credible mutual best responses can be thought of as forming a self-enforcing contract.
Before turning to the determination of the equilibrium, some preliminary results and notation regarding factor demand and efficienc will
prove useful. First, contrary to the order of play given, suppose the
fir chooses N and K taking the prices w and r as given. The firm’
choices will satisfy the profit-maximizin first-orde conditions of a
competitive firm
R N (N, K ) ⫽ w

(1)
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and
R K (N, K ) ⫽ r.

(2)

The long-run labor and capital demands, LN(w; r ) and LK(w; r ), solve
the system (1) and (2). Each demand has the familiar property that the
quantity of the factor demanded is decreasing in its own price. Solving
equation (1) alone for employment yields the short-run labor demand
function N ⫽ SN(w; K), the semicolon signifying that K is given in
the short run. It, too, has the property that employment and the wage
are inversely related. Further, because R NK (N, K ) ⬎ 0, SN(w; K) increases with an increase in K. In addition, it is well known that SN[w;
K(w ′; r )] ⫽ LN(w; r ) evaluated at w ⫽ w ′ and that at this point of
coincidence the short-run demand for labor is less elastic than the longrun demand.
The efficien (w, N) pairs for a given K lie on the contract curve of
tangencies between the iso-profi and iso-utility curves. Specifically
the tangency condition under the rent maximand is
⫺[R N (N, K ) ⫺ w]/N ⫽ ⫺(w ⫺ w 0)/N,

(3)

where the left-hand side is the short-run iso-profi slope and the righthand side is the iso-utility slope. As is easily confirme from (3), under
the union-rent utility function, the contract curve is vertical at the
competitive-equilibrium employment level SN(w 0 ; K ), the solution
to (1) evaluated at w ⫽ w 0. Thus, the competitive employment level
is the efficien level as well.
For a given level of capital, K A , the relations among the short-run
labor demand, the iso-profi contours, the iso-utility contours, and the
contract curve are illustrated in figur 1. The function SN(w; K A) is the
short-run labor demand curve. The quantity demanded at the competitive wage, SN(w 0 ; K A), then identifie the position of CC A , the contract
curve given K A. Representative iso-profi and iso-utility contours have
also been included.2
Since the union’s payoff does not depend directly on capital, the
efficien level of capital is simply the profit-maximizin choice as determined by equation (2). Thus, the efficien levels of labor and capital
happen to be the competitive-equilibrium levels, the solution to (1) and
(2) with w in (1) set equal to w 0 . Denote these N* ⫽ LN(w 0 ; r ) and
K * ⫽ LK(w 0 ; r ).
With these preliminaries completed, next consider the determination
2. As indicated by the arrow in fig 1 pointing toward the northeast, union utility is
increasing in w and N (in the relevant region, w ⱖ w 0). Given N, the firm’ profi increases
with a fall in w. Given w, profi increases as employment moves toward the demand curve.
Thus, the downward pointing arrow in fig 1 is a shorthand to indicate the firm’ preference
for moving toward inner–nested iso-profi contours. Further, each iso-profi curve has a
slope of zero where it crosses the demand curve.
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Fig. 1.—
The monopoly-union equilibrium, A, and the contract curve showing
efficien employment given K A.

of a Nash subgame-perfect equilibrium of the one-period model. The
credibility condition is implicit in the familiar solution given for the
monopoly-union model of wage and employment determination. For
a given K ⫽ K A , and facing a price w, the firm’ only credible choice
of employment is dictated by the first-orde profit-maximizin condition (1), the short-run labor demand SN(w; K A). As it is illustrated in
figur 1, given K A, the monopoly-union equilibrium (w A, N A) is characterized by the tangency at point A between the iso-utility curve U A and
the short-run labor demand curve SN(w; K A). Foreseeing that the fir
will choose N to maximize profit the union chooses w in order to maximize utility subject to the constraint N ⫽ SN(w; K A).3
3. Not all Nash equilibria are subgame perfect. Consider the strategies w ⫽ w 0 and N
solves R N (N, K) ⫽ w 0 if w ⫽ w 0, and N ⫽ 0 otherwise. These are Nash best replies for
the monopoly-union game, given capital. They also produce the competitive wage and
employment outcome, the most desirable outcome the fir can attain given that labor can
always quit to earn at least the competitive wage. However, despite what the fir desires,
if it was faced with a wage other than w 0, its only credible reply would be to set employment
according to N ⫽ SN(w; K), not N ⫽ 0.
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In figur 1 the iso-profi contour π A ⫽ π(w, N, K A ; r ) has a slope
of zero at point A on the demand curve. So it must cross the iso-utility
curve that is tangent to labor demand at point A, demonstrating that
relative to any given K the monopoly-union equilibrium employment
will be inefficientl low. Conditional on K A, there exists a nonempty
subset of efficien allocations that is mutually preferred to A. In figur
1, these mutually preferred efficien allocations, or core, lie on the contract curve CC A at wages between w fA and w uA on the wage axis. Using
A as the comparator, moving along the isoprofi contour π A ⫽ π(w, N,
K A; r) to its intersection with CC A determines w fA , the highest wage
the fir is willing to pay at the efficien level of employment. Likewise,
again using A as the comparator, moving the iso-utility curve U A to its
intersection with CC A determines w uA , the lowest wage the union would
accept at the efficien level of employment. To anticipate later results,
efficien employment at wages between these reservation wages w fA
and w uA cannot be achieved under a monopoly-union equilibrium, but
these allocations are certainly candidates for support in a repeatedgame equilibrium.
As seen above, each choice of capital will yield a monopoly-union
wage and employment pair. That is, each K will imply its own shortrun labor demand, and each such labor demand will have an associated,
tangent iso-utility curve. In figur 2, the locus of these equilibria is
labeled MUE, for monopoly-union equilibria. Two such equilibria are
illustrated: point A from figur 1, and another point T, the monopolyunion equilibrium associated with K ⫽ K T. Note that because SN(w;
K A) lies below SN(w; K T) in figur 2, it follows from assumptions that
K A ⬍ K T.
Now the slope of MUE cannot be signed. It will be assumed its slope
is positive, implying (as is plausible) that the greater is capital, the
higher will be employment and wages.4
By its choice of K the fir determines which monopoly-union equilibrium along MUE will obtain. Anderson and Devereux (1988) provide
a clever way of geometrically illustrating the equilibrium of the full
one-shot game as a tangency between MUE and an appropriately constructed iso-profi contour. The trick is to recognize that first-orde condition (1) for the profit-maximizin employment of labor is always true
in equilibrium and then to use it to determine K, not N, as a function
of N and w. (Whatever values of N and w emerge in equilibrium, (1)
must hold and K can be inferred.) Label this function K 1(w, N) to signify that K solves equation (1). Profi can then be determined from the
4. The slope of MUE is
⫺R LK (R LL ⫹ LR LLL) ⫹ LR LL R LLK
.
R LK ⫹ LR LLK
The ambiguity of its sign corresponds exactly to the ambiguous effect a shift in demand
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Fig. 2.—
The locus of monopoly union equilibria, MUE, generated by varying
capital.

composite function, π[w, N, K 1 (w, N); r], from which iso-profi contours in (w, N) space can be defined These contours will of course
differ from the short-run iso-profi curve family for which K is given.
The equilibrium of the one-shot game can thus be determined graphically in figur 3 in which the MUE locus is carried over from figur
2. Long-run labor demand LN(w; r) and two key short-run labor demands are included. As mentioned earlier, at a point of intersection of
a short-run demand curve with long-run demand, short-run demand is
less elastic—
and so the schedules cross only once. The curves π E and
π F are representative iso-profi contours for the profi function π[w, N,
K 1(w, N); r]. These iso-profi contours display the same features with
respect to the long-run demand for labor as do capital-fixe iso-profi
(in this case a change in capital shifts short-run labor demand) will have on the price
(wage) set by a monopoly.
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Fig. 3.—
The inefficienc of the one-shot capital-firs equilibrium

E

contours with respect to the short-run demand.5 In deciding how much
to invest, the fir moves along MUE until it reaches tangency E between π E and MUE, with the implication that equilibrium capital is K E
⫽ K 1(w E, N E). Higher levels of profi cannot be attained within the
constraint of the model of union wage and employment determination.6
5. That is, they have positive (negative) slope to the left (right) of long-run demand,
and zero slope where they cross that demand. As before, the firm’ profi increases as it
moves to lower iso-profi contours.
6. The interpretation due to Hirsch and Prasad (1995) is instructive, and for some readers
perhaps more intuitive. Express the locus MUE in parametric form [w(K), N(K)]. The
firm’ problem reduces to the maximization of π(w(K), N(K), K; r )). The first-orde condition for this problem is
[R N ⫺ w(K)]dN/dK ⫹ [R K ⫺ r ⫺ (dw/dK)N] ⫽ 0.
From (1) the firs term is zero, leaving R K ⫽ r ⫹ (dw/dK)N. With a positively sloped
MUE, dw/dK ⬎ 0: the fir faces an effective price of capital, r ⫹ (dw/dK)N, greater than
the market rate r. At this effective price, the long-run demand for labor passes through E
and lies below the long-run demand at a price of capital of r. The monopoly union, in
essence, not only drives up the price of labor but also that of capital.
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Finally, now that the full equilibrium has been determined, what of
the efficienc of capital? As was established earlier, the unique efficien
combination of labor and capital (N*, K *) is determined by first-orde
conditions (1) and (2) with the wage set equal to the competitive level
w 0. Along long-run demand LN(w; r ) in figur 3 the first-orde conditions (1) and (2) hold simultaneously. Thus, at the competitive wage
w 0 the long-run demand curve determines N *. The contract curve CC *
is accordingly positioned vertically at N * in figur 3, while the identity
SN[w; K (w; r)] ⫽ LN(w; r ) is used to establish the position of SN(w;
K *) relative to the long-run demand. Note also that, because short-run
demand is less elastic than long-run demand, SN(w; K E) lies below
SN(w; K *). Thus, because short-run demand follows the marginal revenue product of labor R N, and R NK ⬎ 0, the implication is K E ⬍ K *. By
the standard of efficiency both capital and labor are underutilized in
the equilibrium of the one-shot game. The extent to which the efficien
outcome (N*, K*) can be sustained in a repeated-game context is the
subject of the balance of the article.
III. Repeated Play: Preliminaries

In subsequent sections, three alternative repeated games are considered.
The firs of these is repeated play of the monopoly-union model taking
capital to be exogenous. This is the repeated game considered by Espinosa and Rhee (1989). The second variant extends the firs by appending at the outset a once-and-for-all choice of capital by the firm
Here, the natural interpretation is that capital is perfectly durable
and irreversible. Also an extension of the first the third variant is,
strictly speaking, the repeated game of the one-shot game of Section
II. Capital lasts one period and is chosen by the fir at the outset of
each period.
To maintain comparability among the one-shot game and the two
variants of repeated play with endogenous capital, the price of capital
is expressed in terms of its rental price r per period. As a consequence, the efficien mix of labor and capital remains (N*, K *), the
same as in the one-shot game. In particular, by holding constant the
rental price of capital r, the firm’ discount factor δ will have no effect on the efficien level of capital. The roles that the discount factor
of the fir and the lifetime capital play strategically in sustaining an
efficien equilibrium can thereby be addressed without ambiguity. It is
well known that, for a given price of capital of a given lifetime, a
decrease in the discount factor decreases the present value of the stream
of capital services, thereby reducing the level of capital preferred by
the firm The analysis here instead takes the rental price for the services
of capital as given, and therefore the efficien level of capital is the
same throughout the analysis. The price of capital is not independent
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but is inferred from the exogenously given rental price and discount
factor.
The firm’ objective at date t is to maximize the discounted sum of
T
δ s π(w s , N s, K s ; r ), where δ ⬍ 1 is the aforementioned disprofits ∑ s⫽t
count factor of the fir and T is the firm’ time horizon.7
For the union objective at date t, two alternative specification are
considered. One is to assume the union has its own discount factor δ u
⬍ 1 and a horizon T matching that of the firm Then, its objective is
∑ Ts⫽t δ su U(w s , N s). In the second specification the union has a horizon
of just one period so that the objective of the union is simply U(w t ,
N t). Equivalently, the second specificatio is a specialization of the firs
in which the union’s discount factor is zero.
As in the one-shot game, the equilibrium concept of subgame perfection will also be applied to the repeated games. Note that subgame
perfection means that the fir and the union are constrained by their
own future objectives even if their discount factors are not zero. This
is the reason for specifying the objectives not just at the start of the
game but at every date.
In what follows, the horizon T is replaced with infinity For a finit
horizon it is well known that if the equilibrium of the one-shot game
is unique, as it is here, then the repeated game equilibrium outcome
will in each period duplicate this one-shot equilibrium (e.g., Telser
1980). The reason is that the last period of play is identical to a oneshot game. Recognizing that the last period of play has a unique equilibrium that is not influence by earlier moves, the penultimate period
also is equivalent to the one-shot game. Continuing back in this way,
every period is identical to a one-shot game. In the monopoly-union
context this precludes the possibility of an efficien outcome. Our subsequent analysis will, therefore, focus exclusively on infinitel repeated
play.
Finally, only stationary equilibria will be considered—
that is, for all
t, (w t, N t, K t) ⫽ (w, N, K). Note that the assumptions of the model
imply efficien equilibria are stationary in employment and capital.

7. The discount factor corresponds in continuous time to δ ⫽ exp(⫺ρD), where D is
the length of the period and ρ is the firm’ rate of time preference. It is plausible to suppose
that the rate of time preference of the fir equals the market rate of interest. References
below to the feasibility of cooperative outcomes ‘‘for a discount factor sufficientl close
to one’’ can be interpreted to mean ‘‘for rates of time preference or length of period suffi
ciently close to zero.’’ Game theorists typically regard the length of the period and the
rate of time preference as beyond the scope of their analysis. Nevertheless, as a referee
has pointed out, the results derived below do suggest two intriguing possibilities. First, if
the length of the period is interpreted as the wage-contract length, then there are mutual
benefit to negotiating a shorter contract length. Second, if the market rate of interest
determines the rate of time preference, then the larger the market rate, the less likely is
an efficien outcome.
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IV. Exogenous Capital

In Espinosa and Rhee (1989), the one-shot monopoly-union game is
infinitel repeated. Although capital is exogenous, their results provide
a useful stepping stone to the analysis of endogenous capital.
Let capital take any arbitrary value K A. Refer to figur 1. What Espinosa and Rhee show is that, for any efficien allocation on the contract
curve CC A between w uA and w fA, the efficien allocations mutually preferred to the one-shot equilibrium A can be supported in equilibrium
provided the firm’ discount factor is close enough to one.
To review their results, consider the following strategies:
N t ⫽ SN(w 0; K A)

if w t ⫽ w ′ and the action N s ⫽ SN(w 0 ; K A) has
been taken each time that w s ⫽ w ′ for s ⬍ t,

N t ⫽ SN(w t ; K A)

otherwise;

and
w t ⫽ w ′ if the fir
wt ⫽ wA

has always adhered to its strategy,

otherwise.

If these strategies are used, then [w′, SN(w 0 ; K A)] will be the outcome
in each period. Also, let w′ belong to the necessarily nonempty interval
(w uA , w fA ) as indicated in figur 1 so that the fir achieves greater profi
and the union achieves greater utility than at point A, the one-shot equilibrium.
Under these strategies, any deviation by the union triggers on-thedemand punishment by the firm specifically a move back onto the
firm’ labor demand curve for that period only. A deviation by the fir
triggers a permanent move to the monopoly-union equilibrium.
As long as the firm’ discount factor is sufficientl close to one, these
strategies will constitute an equilibrium. The sequencing of moves
within a period permits the fir to condition employment on the contemporaneous wage, thereby enabling immediate retribution. At the
wage w ′ ⱖ w uA , the simple threat to leave the contract curve CC A in
figur 1 and go to the demand curve for one period is adequate to deter
the union—
if it fails to choose w ′ in a period, the best it can achieve is
its utility at A, which is no better than if it had not deviated. Importantly,
irrespective of the union’s horizon or its discount factor, the union’s
strategy is a best reply to the firm’ strategy. And the firm’ threat is
credible. As can be seen in figur 1, beginning on CC A at a given wage
of w, the firm’ profi is increasing as its employment declines until
the short-run demand SN(w; K A) is reached. The fir can never do
better in the current period than move to its demand curve, and under
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the strategies specifie above there are no future consequences if that
move is triggered by a deviation by the union.8
And what of the firm’ promise to choose SN(w 0 ; K A) if it faces the
wage demand w ′? Unlike punishment of the union, any punishment of
the fir by the union (or unions) must rely on future, rather than immediate, consequences. Under the strategies specified if the fir ever
chooses an employment level other than SN(w 0 ; K A) after the union
has chosen w ′, then the union will react by demanding w A in each subsequent period. This reaction can be interpreted as a permanent loss
of trust in the firm The players all revert to playing their one-shot
strategies, yielding outcome A in figur 1. These one-shot strategies
are mutual best replies in the infinitel repeated game regardless of
the history of play and are thus available to the players as a credible
punishment. In short, the loss of trust in the fir is a self-fulfillin
prophecy.
Having seen that the union will punish the firm it is left to check
that this punishment will deter the fir from cheating. If the fir does
cheat, its highest immediate payoff will be
π[w′, SN(w′; K A), K A; r] ⬎ π[w ′, SN(w 0 ; K A), K A; r ]
⬎ π[w A , SN(w A ; K A), K A; r ],
which is achieved by moving to the short-run demand curve. The effects of cheating can be traced using figur 1; the fir receives an
immediate one-period gain by moving from CC A to SN(w ′; K A), albeit
at the cost of a permanent reduction in the future stream of profi when
the union duly reacts by raising the wage to w A. For any w′ ⬍ w fA, there
exists a discount factor δ sufficientl close to one such that the punishment will exceed the gain. Specifically δ must satisfy
π[w ′, SN(w 0 ; K A), K A; r ]
ⱖ π(w′, SN(w ′; K A), K A; r)
1⫺δ

冦

冧

π[w A , SN(w A ; K A), K A; r ]
⫹δ
1⫺δ

(4)

or, rearranging,
δⱖ

π[w′, SN(w ′; K A), K A; r ] ⫺ π[w′, SN(w 0 ; K A), K A; r]
. (5)
π[w ′, SN(w′; K A), K A ; r ] ⫺ π[w A , SN(w A ; K A), K A; r]

For any w ′ satisfying w uA ⱕ w′ ⱕ w fA, therefore, there exists a δ such
that an efficien outcome can be achieved as a self-enforcing equilibrium.
8. For more on efficien play between long-run and short-run players, a useful starting
point is Kreps (1990).
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Fig. 4.—
The sustainable set of efficien equilibria given

K A and δ

Alternatively, for a given δ, is there a sustaining wage set, a set of
wages that will sustain efficien outcomes? Now, for δ ⫽ 0, the sustaining wage set is empty. Under δ ⫽ 0, condition (5) implies that the
fir pays w ′ ⫽ w 0 , which is in turn less than w uA, the lowest wage the
union would accept at the efficien level of employment. It follows that
a discount factor of zero is incompatible with efficiency Rather, there
exists a critical value δ c , such that for all δ in the interval δ c ⱕ δ ⬍ 1
there is a nonempty sustaining wage set, a proper subset of the interval
w uA ⱕ w′ ⱕ w fA. Replacing the inequality in (5) with an equality and
solving for w ′ define a function w f (δ; K A).9 Values w uA and w f (δ; K A)
are then the lower and upper bounds of the sustaining wage set. Figure
4 illustrates for the case δ ⱖ δ c. The sustaining wage set is that portion
of CC A covering wages between w uA and w f (δ; K A). Note that if δ ⬍
δ c , then the sustaining set is empty.10
9. Here it is assumed the right-hand side of (5) is monotonically increasing in w ′.
10. Espinosa and Rhee (1989, p. 571) go on to show that a positive discount factor
allows mutually beneficia improvements on the one-shot outcome, even if the discount
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Endogenous Capital

A. Perfect Durability
The key insight in Espinosa and Rhee (1989) is that, because of the
natural order of play, efficien outcomes can be achieved in equilibrium, even if only the fir has a long-run horizon. To what extent does
this insight carry over once capital is endogenized?
Take Espinosa and Rhee’s game tree and graft on to it an opening
once-and-for-all choice of capital by the firm The natural interpretation
is that capital is perfectly durable and irreversible. The fir commits
to a perpetual lease at a per period rental price of r for each unit of
capital. As discussed in Section III, expressing the cost of capital in
terms of its rental price achieves comparability of the perfect durability
case with the earlier one-shot model and with the later case of finitel
durable capital.
For each value of capital, there follows a subgame that is the repeated
game of the exogenous capital model just considered. Subgame perfection implies that play from that point must itself be a Nash subgameperfect equilibrium.
If an equilibrium is to be efficient play subsequent to the installation
of K must be efficien if the efficien level of capital K * is chosen.
Once K * has been sunk, the preceding analysis of exogenous capital
can be applied. Given a w ′, there is a minimal δ required to achieve
efficien employment. Or, alternatively, δ must exceed a critical value
in order for the sustainable set of efficien equilibria to be nonempty.
However, the fir must also fin it attractive to choose K * over any
other K. Suppose that if K * is not chosen the players go permanently
to the one-shot monopoly-union equilibrium associated with the chosen
K. (Again, this is always one equilibrium of such a subgame.) The best
outcome for the fir amongst these alternatives (K ≠ K *) is the oneshot endogenous capital outcome, namely, point E in figur 5, which
carries over from figur 3.
As can be seen from figur 5, the fir can guarantee itself more
profi at E than it can achieve at point T, the one-shot equilibrium associated with K *. As a result, some of the efficien outcomes that can
be supported in the repeated game given K * might not be achievable
when capital is endogenous. To induce the fir to select K * adds a
further limitation: the fir must earn at least π E ⫽ π(w E, N E, K 1 (w E,
N E ); r), not just π T ⫽ π(w T, N T, K *; r).
factor is not sufficientl large to support an efficien outcome. As pointed out earlier, the
discount factor depends on the rate of time preference and the length of a period (which
can be interpreted as the contract length). If the rate of time preference equals the market
rate of interest, then the discount factor can be computed from observable variables. But
in order to quantify the effect these variables have on the sustainable set, the entire model
would have to be parameterized.
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Fig. 5.—
Efficiency durability, and the repeated game

Figure 5 illustrates. The iso-profi contour π E is a hybrid. Below
LN(w; r), it is drawn for K satisfying equation (1). Recall that this is
done in order to fin the one-shot endogenous capital equilibrium point
E. But above the long-run demand, the continuation of π E is drawn for
K satisfying equation (2). (Along LN(w; r), both (1) and (2) hold, so
the contour π E is continuous where it intersects long-run demand.) Let
K 2 (r, N) be the function that solves equation (2) for K. At point B f,
the intersection of π E with the contract curve CC *, N ⫽ N * and, because K * ⫽ K 2 (r, N *), K ⫽ K *. The wage coordinate of B f establishes
the highest wage the fir would be willing to pay to enter into an
efficien contract.
The wage coordinate of B u establishes the lowest wage the union
would accept once K * is installed, assuming for now that the firm’
strategy is to deploy Espinosa and Rhee’s (1989) on-the-demand punishment if the union cheats on the wage. In figur 5, B u lies above B f
on the wage scale, although the reverse can also occur. In the case
illustrated, no efficien contract that utilizes on-the-demand punishment
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is self-enforcing—
irrespective of the firm’ discount factor. The reason
such a case can arise is that, unlike the exogenous capital model, the
parties do not compare the proposed efficien outcome with the same
monopoly-union equilibrium (point A in figur 1). Rather, the fir
compares the proposed efficien outcome with point E in figur 5, while
the union compares the proposed efficien outcome with point T in
figur 5. Clearly, the comparators are different.
If, instead, B u lies below B f on the wage scale, then for each wage
in that interval an efficien outcome is self-enforcing for δ sufficientl
close to one. Alternatively, given δ there is a set of sustainable effi
cient equilibria given K*, which define one upper bound on the wage.
Endogenizing capital adds an additional constraint on the set of sustainable efficien equilibria, a constraint that is binding if the upper
bound on wages given K* lies above B f on the wage scale.
B. Finite Durability
Assume that rather than being perfectly durable, capital can be costlessly adjusted at the start of each period. From the standpoint of
achieving an efficien outcome, the advantage is that a harsher punishment can be imposed on the union that cheats. This is an effect along
the lines suggested by Baldwin. But there is also a downside risk. Flexible capital weakens the union’s punishment of the fir that cheats.
To simplify the explanation of the latter effect, suppose that the
union discounts the future entirely (δ u ⫽ 0). Further suppose that with
perfectly durable capital an efficien outcome is possible. For any such
equilibrium there is a minimum fir discount factor necessary to
achieve that result. Now consider flexibl capital. If the fir cheats on
employment, then its per period payoff in the punishment phase is its
one-shot equilibrium payoff, not the smaller MUE payoff at the effi
cient level of capital. This in turn raises the minimum fir discount
factor necessary to achieve the same efficien result. As a consequence,
efficien outcomes that could be achieved if capital were rigid become
less likely with flexibl capital.
The more familiar effect, working to expand the possible efficien
outcomes, requires that the union’s horizon extend beyond the present
period. In comparison with perfect durability, the ability to choose capital each period enables the fir to respond to union misbehavior by
reducing the union’s future payoffs. Provided the discount factors of
both the fir and the union are sufficientl close to one, there will exist
efficien allocations that can be achieved in equilibrium that did not
exist under rigid capital.11 The reason is that the union can now be
made to effect a comparison with the same alternative outcome as the
11. Similarly, there will exist values of δ for which flexibilit is necessary to achieve
an efficien equilibrium.
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firm To understand this, consider the one-shot monopoly-union equilibrium outcome (w E, N E, K E), corresponding to point E in figur 5.
Choose an efficien allocation (w ′, N *, K *) from the core of allocations
that is mutually preferred by both the fir and the union to (w E, N E,
K E). For discount factors sufficientl close to one, such an allocation
can be achieved in equilibrium by an appropriate mutually reinforcing
credible deterrent. Specifically if the outcome in a round ever differs
for any reason from (w′, N *, K *), play in subsequent rounds switches
to the strategies used in the one-shot capital-firs equilibrium.
VI. Reputation for Toughness

The foregoing discussion of endogenous capital limited the fir to using on-the-demand punishment for union malfeasance. However,
harsher short-term cuts in employment can also be credible. The idea
is to obtain more leverage from the firm’ regard for the future. The
fir has an interest in maintaining not only a reputation for honesty
but also a reputation for toughness.12
Regarding the union horizon, let us focus on the most challenging
case for achieving efficiency namely, a union with a one-period horizon. Thus, attention will be duly restricted to one-period punishment
in response to a union holdup.
Consider the following strategies:
1. For the firm at each round t,
a) if it has always adhered to its strategy,
i) install K t ⫽ K *.
ii) If w t ⫽ w ′, choose N t ⫽ N *. Otherwise, maximize profi
subject to the constraint U(w t, N t) ⱕ U(w′, N *).
b) If it has ever failed to adhere to its strategy prior to round t, then
henceforth play according to its one-shot capital-firs equilibrium strategy.
c) If K t ≠ K *, choose N t according to its monopoly-union equilibrium strategy given K t.13
2. For the union, at each round t,
a) if the fir has never deviated from its strategy (including capital
choice in round t), choose w t ⫽ w ′.
b) Otherwise, choose w t to maximize U(w t, N t) subject to N t ⫽
SN(w t, K t).
12. This notion could also be applied to expand the set of efficien equilibria in Espinosa
and Rhee’s setting with exogenous capital.
13. Note that the firm’ strategy here applies to the setting where capital has a oneperiod life. With small modification it can be adapted to the infinitel durable case, and
the equilibrium analysis will go through with little change.
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Finally, (w′, N *, K *) is an allocation located on the contract curve
CC * which gives the union at least U(w 0, N *) and gives the fir at
least as much as the one-shot-capital-firs equilibrium. It will be shown
that these strategies constitute a Nash subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Note that the fir in 1a ii utilizes the least-cost ‘‘punishment schedule’’ for employment, namely, the employment schedule that maximizes profi in the current period subject to the condition that the union
not gain from demanding a wage different from the contract wage w ′.
The intersection of SN(w, K *) and the locus given by U(w, N) ⫽ U(w′,
N *) define a critical wage. Below that critical wage this schedule follows SN(w, K *), that is, on-the-demand punishment. Above that critical
wage, the punishment schedule instead follows the locus U(w, N) ⫽
U(w′, N *), namely, off-the-demand punishment.
If strategies 1 and 2 are deployed, the outcome is (w′, N *, K *),
which is a member of the set of efficien outcomes. Are 1 and 2 equilibrium strategies? Consider the union. It is enough to sort subgames according to whether the fir has deviated. First, consider the case where
the fir has never deviated. The union cannot gain from departing from
2a, thereby initiating a deviation. If the union did deviate, the firm’
response would be to implement the punishment in 1aii, which, by
construction, does not allow the union to gain from cheating. Second,
consider histories where the fir has cheated. Because the firm’ strategy says that once it cheats it will henceforth play as if engaged in a
one-shot game, the union can do no better than choose a wage as if it
were playing a one-shot game. The union will adhere to 2b.
And what of 1, the firm’ strategy? To start, suppose the fir at some
time fails to utilize strategy 1. The union’s reaction according to 2b
would be to play as if engaged in a one-shot game. The union in essence
forms an unshakeable belief about the fir that deviates from its strategy. If the fir cheats on employment, the union concludes the fir
is untrustworthy—
just as in Espinosa and Rhee’s (1989) analysis, the
fir would lose its reputation for honesty. The firm’ reputation for
toughness is at stake in a subgame where the union has cheated. If the
fir fails to carry out its off-the-demand punishment, the union concludes the fir is weak and will never carry out off-the-demand punishment. Once the union has been triggered to behave according to its
one-shot strategy—
that is, once it has formed an unshakeable belief
the fir is untrustworthy or weak—
the fir can do no better than to
confir those beliefs and play as specifie in 1b and 1c.
So will the fir ever deviate? First, it will not cheat on capital. Given
the union’s immediate response, the fir can do no better from cheating
than the one-shot capital-firs equilibrium. But it prefers (w ′, N *, K *).
Second, failure to be tough with a union that cheats yields a saving in
the current period but at the price of permanently lower profitability
It follows that the fir will choose to carry out its threats, thereby
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maintaining its reputation for toughness, as long as its discount factor
is sufficientl close to one. Finally, what of the firm’ temptation to
cheat on the employment agreement? The analysis is familiar. Compared with the constant stream of profi π(w′, N *, K *; r ) along the
equilibrium path of play, it obtains a one-time gain at the expense of
a permanently lower stream of profi in the future. For a discount factor
sufficientl close to one, cheating on the labor agreement does not pay.
VII. Conclusion

This article has sought to modify Baldwin’s (1983) influentia study
of the efficienc of investment under self-enforcing union contracts in
two major respects. First, it recasts her treatment by locating it in the
context of the monopoly-union and efficient-contrac models. Second,
it adheres throughout to a formal game-theoretic approach. If the focus
is narrowly on on-the-demand punishment, our game-theoretic results
reaffir Baldwin’s prescription for deterring union malfeasance,
namely, lengthen the union’s time horizon or shorten the replacement
cycle of capital. That said, much of our analysis has suggested that
union malfeasance does not necessarily underpin suboptimal investment.
Moreover, the effect on efficienc of a shorter economic life of capital is itself not unambiguous. In particular, we identifie the potential
for malfeasance on the part of the fir and not just the union. This
approach allowed us to obtain the more exotic result that, where capital
has a short lifetime, the ability of the union to punish the fir for opportunistic behavior is reduced—
a result that clearly turns one Baldwin
prescription on its head.
It was also argued that the fir can credibly impose punishment that
is harsher than the conventional on-the-demand form, buttressing the
broad conclusion of the article that the union’s horizon and the durability of capital are not necessarily crucial to efficiency Specifically sufficien patience by the fir will suffic to make credible retribution
that has the superficia appearance of a self-destructive threat. Stated
another way, underinvestment may stem from an insufficien fir discount factor.
In the world of efficien equilibria as constructed here, no punishment is ever meted out for the obvious reason that no one breaks the
agreement. But the real world admits of such things as lockouts, walkouts, and slowdowns. Repeated-game models of oligopolistic collusion
have dealt with a similar discrepancy by showing that incomplete information regarding market demand can produce alternating phases of collusion and price wars brought on by the suspicion of cheating. This
suggests a promising development of the model would be to incorporate the effects of incomplete information on the efficienc of union
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contracts. Prior to that, however, a more important task is to further
parameterize the model so as to gauge the likelihood of observing inefficien contracts and the relative contribution of their proximate causes.
Finally, we have not up to this point addressed the small but growing
empirical literature dealing with union effect on investments in physical
and intangible capital. That literature points unequivocally to lower
investment in the presence of unions (see, e.g., Hirsch 1991; Bronars
and Deere 1993; Bronars, Deere, and Tracy 1994; Cavanaugh 1996;
Fallick and Hassett 1996). Whether this association is merely an artifact
of selection or is underinvestment stemming from unionization has not
been resolved empirically. Even if there is underinvestment, one should
be more than usually careful in attributing blame. Without a union there
can of course be no conflic over the division of the surplus. However,
this conflic in and of itself does not lead to suboptimal investment.
Other factors must be present as well. It has been shown here that these
must encompass not just union myopia but also the firm’ patience
and the durability of its capital. The task for the empirical literature—
abstracting from selection issues—
is now to determine the contribution
of each of these factors to the lower levels of investment observed in
union settings.
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